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Abstract 
Acquisition premiums help to explain the motives that acquirers link to 
control.  For a sample of 255 European bank mergers, we analyze the 
takeover premiums paid by bidding institutions.  We find that bidders 
value profitable, high-growth and low-risk banks.  We also find some 
evidence that bank regulation and deposit insurance regimes in Europe 
have measurable effects on target valuations.  Targets in stricter 
regulatory regimes, presumably because of the higher expected costs of 
compliance, attract lower premiums.  However, we find no evidence that 
bidders seek to extract benefits from regulators either by paying a 
premium for deals in less regulated regimes or by becoming ‘too big to 
fail’.   
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
Banco de España, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System.
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What do Premiums Paid for Bank M&As Reflect? 
The Case of the European Union 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 Takeovers in the banking industry are important for all of the reasons that 
takeovers in the nonfinancial sector are important.  Bank takeovers also have important 
implications for prudential supervision and government safety nets.  Domestic takeovers increase 
the relative importance of the combined bank, increasing the pressure to treat these banks as too-
big-to-fail.  Also, cross-border takeovers have both prudential supervision and safety net 
implications.   
While the literature recognizes the importance of U.S. bank takeovers, far less attention 
has been given to takeovers in the European Union (EU).1  This is unfortunate because the EU is 
trying to promote cross-border takeovers as a way of developing a single market in financial 
services, a goal which received added impetus from the adoption of the Euro throughout much of 
the EU.  Attaining this goal requires the growth of cross-border banks because the financial 
systems of most EU countries are bank-based.  The European Commission has expressed 
concern with the slow pace and size of cross-border takeovers, especially relative to domestic 
takeovers as discussed in Hernando, Nieto and Wall (2009).  
 The relative lack of attention to EU takeovers is also unfortunate because the EU 
provides greater diversity of banking and securities laws than the U.S. which allows the testing 
                                                 
1
 For an overview of the European banking literature, see Berglöf, Fulghieri, Gual, Mayer, Barros and Vives (2005) 
and Goddard, Molyneux, Wilson and Tavakoli (2007). 
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of hypotheses which cannot be tested with U.S. data.  One important area where the EU allows 
substantial differences is in the areas of prudential supervision and deposit insurance.  The EU 
directives set minimum standards to harmonize some aspects of bank prudential regulation and 
deposit insurance.  However, discretion given to member states in implementing these directives 
raises the possibility that the remaining cross-border differences may influence bank takeovers.   
 Similarly in the areas of corporate governance and takeover law, the EU sets some broad 
standards but important differences remain across member states.  Some of these rules relate to 
the protection afforded to shareholders.  For example, Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey (2008) 
show that variations in shareholder protections have a significant impact on bidding banks’ stock 
returns around the takeover announcement.  Another important difference relates to the 
acquisition process.  In the vast majority of U.S. acquisitions, the acquirer’s ownership goes from 
less than 5 percent of a U.S. target bank’s shares to 100 percent of the target upon consummation 
of the merger due to federal banking and securities regulations.  In contrast, staggered 
acquisitions in which the acquirer purchases shares in a series of transactions are much more 
common in Europe.  However, almost all EU countries have adopted some version of a 
mandatory bid rules (MBR) whereby once the acquirer owns more than some fixed fraction of 
the target’s voting rights, the acquirer is obligated to make an offer for all of the remaining 
shares at the highest price paid by the acquirer for the target’s shares in a preceding time period 
(typically 12 months). 
The purpose of this paper is to examine one aspect of the bank takeover process, the 
premiums paid in bank takeovers in the EU-25 (before the last enlargement) between 1997 and 
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2007.2  The sample includes both within country and cross-border mergers.  Targets include both 
publicly traded banks and non-trade banks.  Along with a general analysis of takeovers that may 
provide insights useful in building a single market for financial services in the EU, this paper 
provides evidence on the target valuation effects of country’s safety nets, shareholder protection 
as well as some aspects of takeover legislation. 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides a brief informal model of 
the determinants of the prices paid in bank takeovers and applies this informal model to a review 
of the existing literature and develops testable hypotheses.  The third section reviews the data 
and empirical model.  The fourth and fifth sections present the univariate and multivariate 
empirical analysis, respectively.   The paper concludes with a review and policy implications. 
2. Literature review and testable implications 
 Table 1 summarizes a number of these studies of bank takeover pricing in terms of their 
sample selection criteria and whether they use pre-takeover book value or market value as a 
control.3  The only study specifically focused on Europe in Table 1 is Diaz and Azofra (2009), 
which includes mergers only through 2000 and does not explicitly consider any implications 
linked to the government regulation of banks.4 
                                                 
2
 Other possible dimensions for European bank mergers include: (1) the shareholder wealth implications for 
shareholders (Cybo-Ottone and Murcia, 2000; Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey, 2008; and Ekkayokkaya et al., 
2009), (2) the long-run performance following bank M&A (Diaz et al., 2004; Campa and Hernando, 2006), and (3) 
the determinants which make banks takeover targets (Hernando, Nieto and Wall., 2009).   
3
 The dependent variable in almost all papers is some variation on the ratio of the merger price divided by the 
target’s pre-merger value, where pre-merger value is either its pre-announcement accounting (book) value or its pre-
announcement market value.  However, some papers estimate the merger price with either the pre-merger book or 
market value as a control variable. 
4
 The authors are not aware of any other study of the prices paid in European bank mergers. 
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 The next subsection provides a brief informal model of bank takeover pricing.  The 
following subsections apply that model to evaluate the existing literature on the determinants of 
bank takeover prices through.   
2.1 An informal model of bank takeover pricing 
The starting point in valuing a bank to another bank acquirer is the existing value of the 
bank based on its current profitability, its risk and its likely growth based on its recent 
experience.  A bank acquirer must also evaluate how assuming control of the target is likely to 
change the target bank’s value.  These changes in value arise both from changes intrinsic to the 
business due to the change in control and changes in the external environment that are unique to 
banking.  In particular, changes in the combined banks’ exposure to prudential supervision and 
coverage by the safety net.   
 The valuation effects of bank M&A may also depend upon the rules regarding the 
corporate governance of the target and the takeover process.  Rules that strengthen the protection 
of the target’s shareholders increase the share of the target’s profits going to the shareholders 
and, hence, their takeover reservation price.  Rules related to the takeover process may also be 
important in an environment with staggered takeovers.  Absent such rules, the acquirer may pay 
a premium to a few shareholders to obtain effective control and then use such control to squeeze 
the other shareholders into selling at a lower price (see Nenova, 2006).  The EU takeover 
directive has led to the establishment of mandatory bid rules (MBRs) to protect the minority 
shareholders in the target company.  Under an MBR, once the acquirer’s ownership passes some 
threshold, the acquirer is required to make a bid for the remaining shares at a price related to that 
 5 
paid in recent share acquisitions (see Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids).5 
2.2 Current profitability and risk 
 Almost all empirical analyses of takeover pricing follow theory by including a 
profitability measure as a proxy for the target’s expected cash flow as an explanatory variable.  
Target profitability is typically proxied by the target’s return on assets, and, as predicted by 
theory, the coefficient on is generally significantly positive.6   
 Many studies of takeover price do not include a risk term.  Those studies that do include 
such terms often follow Benston, Hunter and Wall (1995) in analyzing whether acquirers pay 
more for banks that would reduce the combined firms overall risk (diversification hypothesis) or 
more for banks that would increase the value of the government safety net to the combined firms 
(deposit insurance put hypothesis).  The diversification hypothesis predicts that acquirers will 
pay less for targets with high variance of own profitability and high covariance with the 
acquirer’s profitability.  The deposit insurance put hypothesis predicts that acquirers will pay 
more for targets with high variance and high covariance.  Benston, Hunter and Wall (1995) and  
Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2000) find support for the diversification hypothesis with 
significant negative coefficients on the variance of the target’s ROE and an insignificant 
coefficients on the covariance of the target and acquirer’s ROE.    Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani 
(2007) report different results, but where significant, the coefficients on the target’s variance of 
                                                 
5
 OJ L 142, 30.4.2004, p. 12–23 
6
 Studies that found a positive coefficient on their measure of profitability include Adkisson and Fraser (1990), 
Beatty, Santomero and Smirlock (1987),  Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani, (2000), Cheng, Gup and Wall (1989), Diaz 
and Azofra (2009), Palia (1993), and Shawky, Kilb and Staas (1996).  Rogowski and Simons (1989) estimate an 
insignificant coefficient on return on equity when the dependent variable is the purchase price to book ratio, but 
obtain a significant positive coefficient when the dependent variable is the purchase price premium to deposits ratio. 
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ROA and covariance also support the diversification hypothesis.7 By contrast, Carbo et al. 
(2009), using a sample of European banks that undertook cross-border M&A activity, find that 
these banks were responding principally to opportunities for shifting risk onto EU safety nets, 
what would be consistent with the deposit insurance put hypothesis. 
  A related strand of literature has analyzed the type of mergers that appear to create more 
value for the shareholders of the merging companies. A common result is that focusing mergers 
usually generate larger returns than diversifying transactions (see DeLong, 2001, and Beitel et 
al., 2004). Thus, bidders might be willing to pay higher premiums in non-diversifying deals as 
they are potentially more value creating. 
2.3 Changes in profitability post acquisition 
Along with the historic profitability of the target, acquirers also value opportunities to 
grow the target’s profits.  One source of profit growth is the asset growth rate of the target bank.  
A common proxy for the potential future growth rate of the target is its historical growth rate.  
Cheng, Gup and Wall (1989) obtain a positive coefficient on core deposit growth and on asset 
growth in many of their specifications.  However, Brewer and Jagtiani (2007) obtain negative, 
often significant coefficients in a model estimating premium over market value.  One way to 
reconcile these seemingly contradictory results is that a premium for growth may already be 
priced into the targets’ stock price and acquirers’ are not expected to increase this growth rate.  
The coefficients on the target asset growth rate in Diaz and Azofra (2009) and in Palia (1993) are 
insignificant.  
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 Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2007) find that the coefficient on the covariance is significantly negative when it is 
interacted with a binary variable that takes a value of one when both the acquirer and target are “too-big-to-fail.” 
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 Higher levels of target bank capital provide some benefits to acquirers in that it allows 
acquirers to grow without a capital contribution from the acquirer while continuing to pay 
dividends.  On the other hand, higher levels of capital also mean a greater value of shares must 
be acquired which would dilute the premium paid per share.  Although the literature finds mixed 
results for the level of capital, the more common result of a negative coefficient supports the 
premium dilution hypothesis.  A significantly positive coefficient on capital is found in the 
model estimated by Adkisson and Fraser (1990).  Significantly negative coefficients are 
estimated in Beatty, Santomero and Smirlock (1987), Diaz and Azofra (2009), Hakes, Brown 
and Rappaport (1997), Rogowski and Simonson (1989), Shawky, Kilb and Staas (1996), and in 
most of the models estimated in Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2007).8  The estimated coefficient 
is insignificant in Palia (1993).  
Another source of profitability and potential growth in profitability is the degree of 
market concentration in the target’s market.  More concentrated markets may offer greater 
opportunities to increase profits.9  Beatty, Santomero and Smirlock (1987) obtain a positive 
coefficient on the Herfindahl index of the target’s markets and Palia (1993) find that the 
coefficient on the four firm concentration ratio in the target’s state is significantly positive in a 
model estimating the book value premium.  However, the coefficient on the four firm 
concentration ratio of the target state in Hakes, Brown and Rappaport (1997) is insignificant as 
are the Herfindahl index in Rogowski and Simonson (1989) and for the target’s country in Diaz 
and Azofra (2009). 
                                                 
8
 The equity capital variable in Beatty, Santomero and Smirlock is the sum of equity capital and the loan loss 
allowance divided by total capital. 
9
 A positive correlation would also be expected if banks in more concentrated markets can maintain their current 
level of profitability without increasing their risk. 
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Cross-border acquisitions offer opportunities to both increase and decrease the 
profitability of the target.  The opportunity to increase the profitability comes from the potential 
for the acquirer to take innovations in its home market and bring them to the acquirer’s market. 
However, cross-border mergers limit the scope for cost savings (e.g. by saving on duplicate 
branch networks) and increase the possibility that the acquirer will make cultural or legal 
mistakes in its management and marketing of the target bank after the acquisition.   
‘Cross-border’ takeovers in a U.S. context are takeovers across state boundary lines.  As 
the differences between U.S. states are generally smaller than those between EU member states, 
cross-border acquisitions in the U.S. arguably offer both smaller potential benefits and costs.  
Palia (1993), Rogowski and Simonson (1989)  and Shawky, Kilb and Staas (1996) estimate a 
significantly positive coefficient on interstate banking whereas Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani 
(2000) obtain significantly negative coefficients.  The estimated coefficient for cross-border 
takeovers is insignificant in Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2007) and Hakes, Brown and 
Rappaport (1997).  The coefficients on a binary variable for cross-border takeovers in Europe 
estimated by Diaz and Azofra (2009) in various models are consistently insignificant. 
One of the costs of a takeover is that of integrating the target bank into the acquirer.  
Banks that are smaller relative the acquirer are likely to be easier and lower cost to integrate into 
the acquirer.  However, once the integration is complete, relatively larger targets may provide the 
acquirer with greater economies of scale.  Relatively larger targets may also increase the chances 
that the post-merger banking organization will be considered “too-big-to-fail.”  Consistent with 
lower costs of integration, significant negative coefficients on size are found by Benston, Hunter 
and Wall (1995), Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2007), Cheng, Gup and Wall (1989), Hakes, 
Brown and Rapport (1997) and Palia (1993).  However, Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2000),  
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Brewer and Jagtiani (2007) and Rogowski and Simonson (1989)  obtain a positive coefficient.  
The estimated coefficient on relative asset size is insignificant in Diaz and Azofra (2009). 
Another potential cost of integration arises if there is a mismatch between the extent of 
business line diversification of in the acquirer and that of the target.  The more dissimilar the two 
firms, the greater the potential for high integration costs.  However, more dissimilar business 
lines may also provide greater opportunities for diversification gains.  Diaz and Azofra (2009) 
use cluster analysis to group banks by product strategies and proxy diversification by whether the 
two banks are in the same product group.  That paper estimates an insignificant coefficient on 
their diversification measure. 
2.4 Bank regulation and deposit insurance  
 The principle of minimum harmonization of regulation has been compatible with 
different regulatory and supervisory requirements in the EU. 10 More specifically, differences 
across EU countries are more likely to arise from differences in the costs associated with their 
regulation and deposit insurance.11  It is conceivable that acquirers pay more for targets with 
lower regulatory and deposit insurance costs.  On the other hand, for cross-border mergers 
stricter regulatory regime may increase the bidder’s valuation of the target bank.  This could be 
because given the additional complexity that cross-border M&A entails, stricter regulators may 
increase the acquirer’s trust in the disclosure practices of the target (Buch and DeLong, 2004).   
Studies of domestic bank merger premiums in the U.S. cannot consider regulatory and 
deposit insurance costs because most of those costs are determined by federal policy.  The U.S. 
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 EU Directives on solvency and depositor protection were designed mainly with the aim of discouraging credit 
institutions within the EU from using different features of sound and safety requirements as well as depositor 
protection to compete with each other.  Similar rational can be used for the Directives on investor protection. 
11
 See Kane (2000) and Carbo, Kane, and Rodriguez (2008, 2009). 
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has an incentive compatible mechanism for resolving small and medium sized banks aimed at 
minimizing tax payers’ costs of resolving banks in crisis.12  Such ability has not been 
demonstrated for the largest U.S. banks with the result that many market participants believed 
some U.S. banks were ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF).13  Brewer and Jagtiani (2007) find evidence that 
acquirers pay more for deals that are likely to strengthen the impression that the post-merger 
organization is TBTF. 
2.5 Investor protection and takeover laws 
 More generally, the value that bidders assign to control over a target bank will depend on 
the bidder’s trust in the quality of the target’s disclosure practices as well as in the enforceability 
of the ownership rights which are being acquired.  The legal protection of minority shareholders 
varies substantially across countries with wide-ranging implications for the development of 
financial systems and the design of corporate governance systems (LaPorta et al., 1998; Djankov 
et al., 2008).  When investor protection is weak, insiders (managers and majority shareholders) 
enjoy more opportunities to expropriate minority shareholders and extract higher private benefits 
of control (Dyck and Zingales, 2004).  Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Bris and Cabolis (2008) 
show that takeover premiums increase under higher protection regimes and interpret this as 
evidence that investor protection increases activity in the market for corporate control. 
Studies of domestic bank takeover premiums in the U.S. do not consider investor 
protection rules, which are partly determined by federal standards and partly by state policies.  
                                                 
12
 The U.S. banking literature has historically focused on size as a proxy for a bank’s importance to financial 
stability, thus, the focus in literature on “too-big-to-fail” banks.  Most recently, many analysts have come to 
recognize that while size is correlated with a bank’s importance to financial stability, size per se is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for a bank to be systemically important. 
13
 See Stern and Feldman (2004). 
 11 
Diaz and Azofra (2009) also do not consider investor protection.  However, Hagendorff, Collins 
and Keasey (2008) analyze the impact of investor protection regimes in Europe and the U.S. on 
stock returns around the time of bank takeover announcements.  Their results indicate that bidder 
banks receive higher returns when the target is in a low investor protection country.  This is 
consistent with target shareholders receiving a smaller portion of the gains in countries with low 
investor protection. 
Finally, bank merger valuations may also reflect the extent to which takeover legislation 
requires premiums to be shared among equity holders.  For listed firms, the EU Takeover 
Directive has introduced mandatory bid rules (MBRs) in most countries.  By requiring bidders to 
(i) tender for all remaining shares once they exceed a certain ownership threshold in the target 
and (ii) to pay a price based on when it passed the MBR threshold, MBRs protect minority 
shareholders from being squeezed into accepting a low premium once the transfer of the 
controlling block of voting rights has been completed (Nenova, 2006).  Since controlling holders 
will be unable to attract the type of large premium which reflects their private benefits of control, 
MBRs are likely to lower their premiums, while increasing the premiums going to minority 
shareholders (see Dyck and Zingales, 2004).  The model in Diaz and Azofra (2009) includes the 
acquirer’s pre-acquisition ownership interest as a control for staggered takeovers.  However, the 
model does not have any control for whether the acquisition triggers the MBR.  
2.6 Other hypotheses  
 Prior studies have considered various other hypotheses that are either not relevant to the 
EU or not testable for our sample of banks.  An example of a hypothesis that is not relevant to 
this paper is Adkisson, and Fraser (1990) inclusion of a binary variable for restrictions on 
intrastate takeovers that existed during for its sample.   
 12 
A common set of hypotheses that are not testable with the available data for this paper’s 
sample relate to the board and ownership structure of the target and sometimes also that of the 
acquirer.  Papers including measures of these structures include Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani, 
(2000), Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani, (2007), and Palia (1993). 
3  Empirical Strategy:  Data and Model  
3.1 The Sample 
We obtain the sample of European bank mergers from Thomson Financial’s M&A 
database.  Deals are announced and completed between 1997 and 2007.  Sample banks include 
commercial banks, mortgage and real estate banks, medium- and long-term credit banks, and 
bank holding companies which are chartered in the EU-25.  We impose the following sampling 
criteria:  The acquirer purchases at least 1% of the target’s equity.  Thomson Financial reports 
the value of the acquisition.  Sample banks are not subsidiaries of financial institutions chartered 
outside the EU.  We eliminate share repurchases from our sample.  Finally, target and bidder 
banks have accounting data available on Fitch IBCA’s Bankscope database.  We ensured that 
accounting data are consistently reported in either International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) or local accounting principles for every deal.14 
We then applied the following data cleaning procedure to our initial sample: 
• We verified the deal characteristics from Thomson Financial (announcement date, 
offer price, deal value) against news articles from various sources on Lexis Nexis.  
                                                 
14IFRS have been introduced after 2004 and apply only to listed banks in our sample.  IFRS introduced the fair value 
treatment of a larger variety of bank assets.  Hence, combing different accounting standards for one bank may cause 
severe measurement errors.  For example, Barclays experienced a year-on-year increase in the value of total assets 
of 30% following the adoption of IFRS. 
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Inconsistencies between the data obtained from Thomson Financial and the press 
coverage of three transactions were corrected or, if left unresolved, 19 deals were 
omitted from our sample. 
• We omit 11 distressed target banks.  We delete deals where the press coverage 
surrounding a transaction indicates that the target was a failing institutions or the book 
value premium paid by the target was smaller than -20%.   
• We delete six observations from our sample where the price paid by the acquirer was 
linked to the exercise of a call option on the target’s equity,  In these cases, the 
takeover premium is likely to have been determined by factors prevailing at the time 
period the option was underwritten.  
The final sample of European bank acquisitions contains 255 deals, of which 75 were 
cross-border and 155 were deals that involved targets that were listed banks.15 We present an 
overview of the sample in Table 2. 
3.2 Takeover Premiums 
In order to compensate for the varying size of the target banks, most studies of bank 
merger pricing incorporate a measure of the pre-merger value of the target’s equity (Shawky, 
Kilb and Staas, 1996; Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani, 2000; Diaz et al., 2008).  One such measure 
of the pre-merger equity is the target’s book value as of the last reporting period before the 
merger announcement.  Although book values are imperfect measures of the economic values, 
bank accounting values are likely to be closer to their economic value because both sides of 
                                                 
15
 In total, 16 out of the 255 deals do not report the value of the BVPREM. As a consequence, our regressions use 
239 deals (146 are listed banks and 74 are cross border deals).  
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banks’ balance sheet are dominated by short-term financial claims whose book value is likely to 
be close to its economic value.   
An alternative is to deflate by the market value of the target’s assets.  The advantage of a 
market measure is that it incorporates the profitability of the target as it is currently being 
operated.  One disadvantage is that it also incorporates investors’ estimate of the expected 
discounted value of a takeover premium.  This component of the target’s stock price may be 
relatively large to the extent that the bank has long been regarded as a takeover target or to the 
extent that individuals with knowledge of the takeover discussions buy the target’s stock in 
anticipation of the takeover.  Another disadvantage is that market values are only available for 
publicly traded banks.  The availability of takeover premium data for non-listed banks is an 
important issue, given the importance of non-listed financial institutions as suppliers of banking 
services in the EU as well as their involvement in the consolidation of national banking sectors 
(see Goddard et al., 2007). 
We measure bank merger premiums as the purchase price paid for by the acquiring 
institution scaled by the pre-merger book value of the target bank’s equity.  We define the 
percentage book value premium (BVPREM) as  
deal valueBVPREM (%) = 1 100,
BV(equity)s
 
− × 
× 
    (1) 
where s is the equity stake purchased and the book value of equity refers to the fiscal year before 
the merger announcement supplied by Thomson Financial. 
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3.3  Regulatory Data 
One of our aims is to investigate whether regulatory differences affect target valuations in 
bank takeovers.  We measure regulatory differences using a measure of regulatory strength, 
deposit insurance design, and the level of investor protection as summarized in Table 3. 
3.3.1 Prudential regulation and supervision (Regulatory Strength) 
We compile an index of regulatory strength based on the Barth et al. (2001) database on 
global banking supervision.  We follow Buch and Delong (2008) and use this database to 
assemble a regulatory strength index which reflects the adoption of twelve supervisory powers 
by national regulators.  The index components are: banks disclose risk management procedures; 
risk-weights are in line with Basle guidelines; the capital–asset ratio varies with credit risk; the 
capital–asset ratio varies with market risk; there is a formal definition of ‘non-performing loan’; 
there are automatic mechanisms to sanction directors and managers; the supervisory agency can 
order directors/management to make provisions to cover losses; the supervisory agency can 
suspend the distribution if dividends, bonuses, or management fees; the latter has been enforced 
in the past five years; the supervisory agency can declare a bank insolvent; the agency can 
suspend ownership rights of a problem bank; the supervisory agency (or any other government 
agency) can take measures aimed at bank restructuring and reorganization.   
The regulatory strength index is an equally-weighted sum of these 12 indicators. 16  
Consequently, the index varies between 0 and 12 with higher scores indicating that banking 
sectors exhibit stronger supervisory environments and better enforcement.   
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 Where the database lists more than one indicator for a single question, we assign an index value of one if two or 
more of the sub questions apply. 
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3.3.2 Deposit Insurance 
We also measure the strength of the deposit insurance regime by assembling a deposit 
insurance index, based on the information reported by the member states.  The index reflects if 
(i) insurance premiums are risk-based, and (ii) the deposit guarantee scheme is pre-funded.  
Consequently, the deposit insurance index varies between 0 and 2 with higher values indicating 
stricter, and to banks, more costly deposit insurance arrangements.   
3.2.3 Investor Protection 
We obtain an index of anti-director rights from La Porta et al. (1998) and, for updated 
values after 2003, from Djankov et al. (2008).  The index measures the extent to which national 
laws protect minority shareholders from opportunistic behavior by managers.  Specifically, it 
reflects the inclusion of six legal provisions as regards the voting rights that shareholder possess 
to influence director appointments and other major corporate issues.  The index varies between 0 
and 6 with higher values indicating that financial systems are more shareholder-oriented.   
In some countries, stricter enforcement of the existing legal provisions may partly 
substitute for weaker investor protection and vice versa (La Porta et al., 1998).  To capture the 
quality of law enforcement, we follow Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Hagendorff et al. (2008) and 
multiply the anti-director index by an index of the rule of law.  We use the rule of law index 
developed by the Worldbank (which we rebase such that it varies between 0 and 10) to capture 
the efficiency of the judiciary and enforceability of contracts through the courts.  We call the 
resulting index investor protection.     
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4.  Univariate Analysis   
In this section, we present preliminary results on some of the key drivers of target 
valuations in European bank mergers.  We examine the price paid for control, the status of the 
target and the geographic focus (cross-border vs. domestic) of the deal. We also analyze the 
impact of regulatory variables on the premiums in European bank mergers.   
4.1 Premiums Paid for control  
In section 2, we discussed the presence of a premium for control as well as the existence 
of MBR rules that protect minority shareholders in the target bank.  Many (bank) M&A studies 
define control conservatively as the acquiring institution owning the majority of the voting 
equity in the target.  In order to explore the threshold at which control takes place, Table 4 
presents the mean and median takeover premiums (BVPREM) for deals that involve a change in 
control and purchases of minority stakes.  We apply various control thresholds to our sample.  In 
particular, we have considered that a change in control may take place, alternatively, when a deal 
causes the bidder to increase its ownership level from <10%, <20%, <30%, <40%, <50% or 
<MBR to above that level.  The MBRs are applicable to the target country and are reported in 
Nenova (2006).  For the full sample, we observe that those deals involving a change in control 
display higher premiums.  The differences in terms of medians are statistically significant for all 
the threshold portfolios defined above.  However, the differences are larger in absolute value for 
those deals that involve trespassing the 20% and 30% thresholds.  The latter is approximately in 
line with the weighted average MBRs of our sample. 17  
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 Weights correspond to the percentage of deals in the target country over total number of deals. 
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As presented in the introduction of this paper, one motivation for this paper is to analyze 
the patterns of staggered bank acquisitions which are common in Europe.  Acquisitions are 
staggered when purchases of bank shares take place in a series of transactions.  According to the 
European Commission (2005), this pattern of acquisition is more prevalent in banking and 
insurance than in other financial market segments.  In our sample, 33 acquisitions involved more 
than one transaction (typically two) between the same acquirer and target.  In most of these cases 
(23), the acquirer ultimately bought 100% of the target bank equity during the sampling period.  
The analysis of the premiums paid in staggered acquisitions sheds further light on the 
price for control since ceteris paribus other determinants of the premium paid remain constant.  
Table 5 shows that the largest median premiums (BVPREM) are paid by acquirers which own 
less than 20% of the target’s equity and increase their shareholding to above that level.     
A control threshold of 20% is consistent with Hernando, Nieto and Wall (2009) and for 
the purpose of our regression model we have considered that a change in control takes place 
when a non listed bank or bank holding company that owns less than 20% of the target equity 
increases its shareholding to at least 20%.18 This level of ownership also represents the minimum 
threshold for authorization by the prudential supervisors of the host country as established in the 
Directive 2007 / 44/ CE of the European Parliament and the Council amending the procedural 
rules and evaluation criteria for prudential assessment of acquisitions and increase of 
shareholdings. For the subsample of listed banks and for the purpose of defining control, we 
have considered the MBR in the target country.  
                                                 
18
 Also, IFRS accounting rules define 20% share ownership as a permanent investment in a company. 
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4.2 Domestic vs Cross-border Bank Mergers 
The European Commission (2005) reports that in the financial sector, domestic deals are 
significantly larger than cross-border ones (leading to ‘domestic champions’ strongly focused on 
one country).  This appears to have been especially true in the years 1999-2000.  Table 6 shows 
that differences in the premiums paid for domestic and cross border deals are neither large nor 
statistically significant (in terms of either mean or median values).  This is somewhat surprising 
given the more pronounced potential to cut costs in domestic mergers and the increased costs of 
cross-cultural and cross-regulatory that are linked to bank merger across borders (Buch and 
DeLong, 2004).  However, for a number of acquirers from markets with already concentrated 
banking sectors, particularly in small countries, there is little alternative to consolidation across 
borders (see Berglöf et al., 2005) 
4.3 Listed versus Non–listed Banks 
One of the advantages of our book value-based measure of takeover premiums is that we 
can also include a wider range of banking firms than listed banks.  We control for whether the 
target is a listed bank (LISTED).  We hold no a priori expectations as regards the effect of this 
variable on premiums.  Listed banks have higher disclosure requirements which may facilitate 
effective due diligence and could prevent bidders from overpaying for targets.  On the other 
hand, the market for corporate control for listed targets should be more liquid and bidding wars 
are more likely to drive up acquisition premiums.   
The results in Table 6 show that bidders pay a lower premium for listed banks.  The 
difference of 24.9 p.p. is statistically significant in terms of medians.  This is consistent with 
explanations which emphasize that the disclosure stipulations on listed banks increase 
transparency and lower the probability of bidders overvaluing targets.  
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4.4 Premiums paid and the regulatory environment 
Regulation (regulatory strength, deposit insurance and investor protection) may impact 
the price that bidders are willing to pay for a target bank in a variety of ways.  On the one hand, 
stricter regulation may facilitate due diligence for bidders and increase their trust in the quality of 
the target’s disclosure practices as well as in the soundness of the target bank in general.  On the 
other hand, stronger regulatory regimes impose higher compliance costs on bidding banks and, in 
the case of bank regulation, may well restrict managerial discretion—with potential implications 
for bank profitability in the post-merger period.  
The results in Table 6 show that all three regulatory variables help explain differences in 
the premiums paid by acquirers.  Acquirers pay lower premiums for banks in countries with 
better protection of minority shareholders. This difference is substantial in absolute value and 
statistically significant both in terms of average and median.  Further, bidders pay lower 
premiums for banks in countries where the strength of the bank regulatory regime is below the 
median EU level.  Along similar lines, stricter deposit insurance arrangements (in terms of the 
funding and risk-based premiums) also mean that investors pay lower premiums (the difference 
for regulatory strength and deposit insurance design are statistically significant for median 
premiums). 
The reported results are consistent with the explanation that regulation entails costs for 
the bidding bank that seem to outweigh any benefits that stricter regulatory frameworks bring 
about in terms of investor protection and banks´ safety and soundness.   
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5.  Regressions  
5.1 Specification 
To analyze the factors that determine target bank valuations in a multivariate setting, we 
estimate the following regression model with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors:  
1 2BVPREM (%) =  + DC+ TC+ REGULAT + ,α β β γ ε     (2) 
where DC a vector of deal characteristics, 
TC is a vector of target bank characteristics, and  
REGULAT includes regulatory variables. 
 
The deal characteristics include the following variables.  CONTROL is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the deal involves a change in shareholder control of the target bank.  As 
discussed in the previous section, we assume that a change in control takes place when a non-
listed bank that owns less than 20% of the target equity increases its shareholding to at least 20% 
and when a listed bank with an initial stake in the target below the MBR (in the target country) 
reaches that threshold after the transaction has been completed.  CROSSB is a dummy variable 
that is one if bidder and target are chartered in different countries (and zero otherwise).  Market 
concentration in the target country is measured by a Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) where 
the market is defined as the country in which the bank is headquartered.19   All else equal, more 
concentrated markets may afford higher rents to banking firms which would consequently be 
prepared to pay higher premiums for acquisitions in more concentrated banking markets (Palia, 
1993).  
RELSIZE measures the value of the combined bidder and target assets divided by bidder 
total assets. We employ this measure as an indicator of the easiness to integrate and also as a 
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 Member State's HHI is calculated according to a common methodology as established by the ECB (see ECB 
banking structures, October, 2006). 
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proxy of TBTF.  Following Benston et al. (1995), we measure potential diversification benefits 
by the covariance of ROE for bidder and target banks in the pre-merger years (COVROE).  A 
negative sign on this variable would indicate that bidders pay more for targets with greater 
potential to smooth earnings.  
Based on Laeven and Levine (2007), we compute an asset-based measure of how focused 
banks are on lending as 1-|(net loans-other earning assets)/total earning assets|.  ASSETDIV is 
the absolute value of the difference of this ratio for bidders and targets.  Bidders may be willing 
to pay larger premiums for banks that engage in forms of income other than interest income (i.e 
fee, dividends and trading income) rather than taking deposits and making loans. 
The variables included in the vector of target bank characteristics are averages over the 
three fiscal years before the deal announcement.  We measure target profitability as the return on 
equity (ROE) and leverage (LEV) as equity divided by total assets.20  We expect higher values of 
ROE and lower levels of LEV to attract higher takeover premiums.  The riskiness of the target 
(RISK) is proxied by the standard deviation of ROE in the pre-merger years.  TAGRWTH is an 
asset-based growth measure over three years.  A positive sign on the growth variable would 
indicate a valuation premium associated with targets operating in expanding markets, while a 
negative sign would signal future asset quality problems linked to growth.21   
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 This definition of leverage accords with the bank supervisory use of the term to mean the equity to asset ratio.  
Note, however, it contrasts with a common definition of leverage in the corporate finance literature where equity is 
the denominator as in the debt to equity ratio or asset to equity ratio. 
21This paper does not include the medium of payment in acquisitions (equity versus cash) because our data source 
appears to contain too many errors. 
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5.2 Results: Target and Deal Characteristics 
Table 7 shows the results of regressions of deal and target bank characteristics on 
BVPREM.  In Column 1, we report the results for the whole sample, whereas in Column 2, we 
report the results for the subsample of listed targets.  The most robust conclusion arising from 
Table 7 is that operating performance and risk are significantly correlated with takeover 
premiums, both for the full sample as well as for the sample of listed targets.  Thus, we find that 
higher target profitability (ROE) and lower target leverage (LEV) are associated with higher 
premiums.  Also, acquirers pay less for targets that are riskier (RISK) and whose ROE exhibits a 
lower covariance (COV) with their own. The later result is consistent both with banks seeking to 
increase the value of the safety net (deposit insurance put hypothesis) and with focusing mergers 
generating greater shareholder value.  However, the negative coefficient on RISK is inconsistent 
with trying to increase the value of the safety net, which suggests that the COV result is more 
likely due to focusing mergers generating greater shareholder value. 
The magnitude of these effects is non-negligible. For the full sample (listed sub-sample), 
a 1 percentage point increase in ROE is associated with a 2% (7%) increase in the average 
premium paid. The larger effect found for the listed targets might be explained by the stricter 
transparency requirements imposed on listed companies in terms of schedule and content and 
audit of their financial statements, which makes their profitability data more reliable from the 
view point of the acquirer.  Further, a 1 percentage point increase in LEV is associated with a 4% 
and 5% decrease in the average takeover premium for the full sample and sub-sample of listed 
banks, respectively. 
The positive and (weakly) significant coefficient on target growth found for the full 
sample indicates that acquirer value fast-growing target banks.  The coefficient on the squared 
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growth term (TARGRWTHSQ) is negative (although statistically insignificant).  For the sample 
of listed targets, neither the linear nor the quadratic asset growth terms enter the specification at 
customary levels of statistical significance. 
The effects of deal characteristics on European takeover premiums are far from 
conclusive.  For the full sample, the only significant coefficient is the cross-border dummy 
(CROSSB).  The negative coefficient reported is consistent with bidders facing greater 
operational difficulties to integrate foreign banks.  The coefficients of the remaining deal 
characteristics are not statistically significant.  Deals involving a change in control, thus, do not 
result in higher premiums than those observed in purchases of minority stakes (even though the 
coefficient has the expected positive sign).  Similarly, takeover premiums are neither related to 
the legal status of the target (listed vs. unlisted) nor to the degree of market concentration (HHI) 
in the host country.  Further, we do not observe a significant relationship between relative size 
(RELSIZE) and target valuations.  Finally, differences in the degree to which the merging banks 
engage in lending (ASSETDIV) are not related to takeover premiums.22 
5.3 Results: Regulation and Takeover Premiums 
Table 8 reports the results of regressions that estimate the impact of the regulatory 
variables for investor protection, deposit insurance, and safety and soundness (regulatory 
strength) on the takeover premiums paid in European banking.  
Concerning the results for the regulatory variables, we do not find a significant effect for 
the shareholder protection proxy neither for the full sample nor for the listed subsample.  
However, we obtain negative coefficients for both the deposit insurance and the regulatory 
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 When we replace the ASSETDIV variable with a variable that captures differences in business lines between the 
merging banks, this new variable turns out to be also non-significant. 
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strength indices.  Both measures are significant for the sample of listed targets, while the deposit 
insurance proxy is close to significance (p-value=0.11) in the case of the full sample.  We 
interpret this negative relationship between takeover premiums and the regulatory indices as 
evidence that stronger regulatory regimes as well as risk-based and pre-funded deposit insurance 
schemes impose higher compliance costs on acquiring banks. 
It is interesting to note that the inclusion of regulatory variables into our regression model 
leaves most of the findings from previous regression specifications unchanged.  The estimated 
coefficients on the risk (RISK) and return (ROE) variable suggest that acquirers are willing to 
pay higher premiums for more profitable and lower premiums for riskier institutions.  In turn, the 
target growth term (TARGRWTH) is significant for the full sample.  Interestingly, the quadratic 
asset growth term (TARGRWTHSQ) is negative and statistically significant.  This result 
indicates that excessively high asset growth rates may serve as an early indicator of asset quality 
problems in the future. 
As regards the coefficients on the deal characteristics, we find some differences with 
respect to the results reported in Table 7.  For the full sample, the cross-border dummy 
(CROSSB) is no longer significant.  In the subsample of listed banks, we observe a positive and 
significant coefficient for the control dummy (as defined by the MBR threshold) suggesting that 
acquirers are willing to pay higher premiums to obtain control, without the existence of 
mandatory bidding rules preventing them from doing so.  Also for the sample of listed banks, a 
positive and significant coefficient is found for the degree of bank concentration of the target 
market which indicates that bidders pay a higher premium for targets in these markets, 
presumably in anticipation of higher rents from market power. 
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Finally, Table 9 shows the results of the estimation of a specification which allows for a 
differential effect of the regulatory variables depending on whether the deal is domestic or cross-
border.23 The estimated coefficients for both target and deal characteristics are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in Table 8.  However, the coefficient estimates of the regulatory 
variables provide interesting insights.  We find that the estimated coefficients of both the 
regulatory strength and the deposit insurance indices are negative and significant, while the 
corresponding interaction terms are positive and significant (with the exception of the deposit 
insurance dummy interacted with the cross-border dummy in the full sample equation).  These 
results are consistent with the univariate analysis above and suggest that in the case of domestic 
deals, stricter regulatory regimes as well as stronger deposit insurance arrangements impose 
higher compliance costs on acquirers that are reflected in lower premiums.  However, in the case 
of cross-border deals, these regulatory costs are compensated by the potential benefits associated 
with entry into a market with a stricter regulatory framework.  This is consistent with Buch and 
DeLong (2004) who argue that stricter regulation makes targets more attractive in cross-border 
deals as a result of increased trust in the disclosure practices.24  Finally, we do not find a 
significant effect for the shareholder protection proxy neither for domestic deals nor for cross-
border transactions. 
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 We have also estimated a specification which allows for a differential effect of the regulatory variables depending 
on whether the target banks belong to a Member State that has only recently joined the EU since 2004 (e.g., 
Hungary, Poland, Romania).  We do not find any differential effect as all the interaction terms are insignificant. 
Nevertheless, this result might be driven by the small number of targets of those countries. 
24
 The estimated effects for the regulatory strength and for the deposit insurance variable indices in the case of cross-
border deals are not significantly different from zero. In particular, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of 
the coefficients of the regulatory strength index and the corresponding interaction term are zero (p-values of 0.93 for 
the full sample and 0.34 for the sample of listed targets). Analogously, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum 
of the coefficients of the deposit insurance index and the corresponding interaction term are zero (p-values of 0.64 
for the full sample and 0.92 for the sample of listed targets). 
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6. Conclusions and Policy Considerations 
 A substantial body of research has examined the patterns and performance of bank 
mergers and acquisitions.  To date, this literature has largely focused on the U.S. with only 
limited evidence outside the U.S. market and very few studies which have examined Europe.  
While M&A has transformed the size of banking firms and widened the scope of activities they 
perform in a number of European economies, policymakers have long been concerned that the 
hitherto slow pace at which bank consolidation takes place in Europe (especially cross-border 
bank consolidation) runs contrary to the Single Market policy of the EU.  In this paper, we 
analyze the premiums paid in European bank mergers.  By analyzing the premiums paid by 
bidding banks, we are able to draw some conclusions as to the motives behind bank M&A in 
Europe.  The EU offers a unique setting to analyze the extent to which regulatory considerations 
motivate M&A and are, thus, reflected in the pricing of bank control.  This is mainly because the 
EU high levels of freedom of capital movements coexist with continuing regulatory differences 
in the form of bank regulation, deposit insurance, and investor protection regimes across 
individual member states.   
 Our results show that bidding banks value more profitable and high-growth banks, and 
pay less for institutions with high equity ratios and high return volatility.   In addition, bidders 
attach a valuation premium to targets that are engaged in similar activities or business segments. 
We find that stricter prudential regulatory regimes and stronger deposit insurance schemes lower 
the takeover premiums paid in bank mergers.  However, this result, presumably in anticipation of 
higher compliance cost, is mainly driven by domestic deals.  For cross-border deals, the benefits 
of entering a highly-regulated foreign market appear to offset the expected regulatory costs 
associated with compliance.   
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Our results have some policy implication.  First, we find no evidence consistent with 
bidders paying to extract benefits from regulators either by paying a premium for less regulated 
regimes or by becoming ‘too big to fail’ in cross border deals.  This should be reassuring to 
regulators as it shows that cross-border bank consolidation in Europe appears to be driven by 
efficiency rather than by attempts of regulatory arbitrage.  Second, stricter bank regulation in the 
target’s country increases target valuations in cross-border as compared to domestic deals.  This 
shows that prudential regulatory regimes can help facilitate the cross-border bank consolidation 
in Europe.   Moreover, it highlights the importance of full harmonization of financial regulation 
to the highest standards in order to secure a level playing field in an integrated financial market. 
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Table 1 
Bank Merger Premium Studies 
 
Paper Sample Time period Premium Measure 
Adkisson, & Fraser (1990) 174 U.S. takeovers 1985-1986 Book value 
Beatty, Santomero and Smirlock 264 U.S. takeovers 1984-1985 Book value 
Benston, Hunter & Wall (1995)   302 U.S. takeovers 1981-1986 Market value 
Brewer, Jackson, & Jagtiani, (2000) 189 U.S. takeovers 1990-1998 Book value 
Brewer, Jackson, & Jagtiani, (2007) 392 U.S. takeovers 1990-2004 Market value 
Brewer, & Jagtiani, (2007) 412 U.S. takeovers 1991-2004 Market value 
Cheng, Gup and Wall (1989) 135 U.S. takeovers 1981-1986 Book value 
Diaz and Azofra (2009) 147 EU takeovers 1994-2000 Book value 
Palia (1993) 137 U.S. takeovers 1984-1987 Book value 
Rogowski and Simonson 168 U.S. takeovers 1984-1987 Book value 
Shawky, Kilb and Staas (1996) 320 U.S. takeovers 1982-1990 Book value 
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Breakdown by country
Full sample Deals with listed target
Cross-border 
deals
Austria 8 5 3
Belgium 3 1 2
Czech Republic 6 4 5
Denmark 7 5 3
Estonia 4 3 3
Finland 1 1
France 25 21 4
Germany 24 16 8
Greece 16 13 4
Hungary 3 1 2
Ireland-Rep 2 2 2
Italy 86 39 7
Latvia 3 2 3
Lithuania 5 5 2
Luxembourg 1 1 1
Malta 3 3 3
Netherlands 2 1
Poland 9 6 7
Portugal 9 7 1
Slovak Rep 4 4
Slovenia 4 4 3
Spain 23 13 4
Sweden 1
United Kingdom 6 4 2
Breakdown by year
1997 17 12 1
1998 34 18 9
1999 34 27 9
2000 40 29 11
2001 25 16 8
2002 19 10 8
2003 23 10 6
2004 19 8 6
2005 13 6 5
2006 20 11 10
2007 11 8 2
Total 255 155 75
Table 2. Number of deals
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Regulatory 
strength
Deposit 
insurance
Austria 9 1 19.1
Belgium 9 1 8.0
Czech Republic 7 1 2.9
Denmark 6 1 19.8
Estonia 8 1 .
Finland 8 2 31.0
France 4 2 24.4
Germany 4 2 19.9
Greece 4 1 12.8
Hungary 9 1 13.3
Ireland-Rep 9 1 36.6
Italy 5 1 8.9
Latvia 5 1 21.5
Lithuania 3 1 23.1
Luxembourg 7 0 17.8
Malta 8 1 .
Netherlands 5 0 21.2
Poland 8 1 12.2
Portugal 6 2 21.2
Slovak Rep 7 1 0.9
Slovenia 9 0 .
Spain 7 1 32.0
Sweden 3 2 25.8
United Kingdom 9 0 42.4
Shareholder protection 
(country avg -1997-2007)
Table 3. Bank regulatory indices
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Mean Median N. obs.
No 136.9 91.9 93
Yes 160.8 122.3 146
Difference -24.0 -30.4 **
No 139.6 86.2 85
Yes 158.1 122.3 154
Difference -18.4 -36.1 **
No 133.7 85.6 90
Yes 162.3 123.1 149
Difference -28.6 -37.4 **
No 146.9 92.3 95
Yes 154.5 122.6 144
Difference -7.6 -30.3 **
No 161.1 92.3 93
Yes 145.4 120.9 146
Difference 15.7 -28.6 *
No 140.4 92.1 92
Yes 158.5 122.6 147
Difference -18.1 -30.5 **
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Control 
(threshold: 30%)
Control 
(threshold: 40%)
Table 4. Premiums (bv_prem) paid by deal characteristics: Control
Control 
(threshold: MBR)
Control 
(threshold: 50%)
Control 
(threshold: 10%)
Control 
(threshold: 20%)
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COMPARISON STAGGERED DEALS - CONTROL DEFINED AS 50% OR MORE
N mean p25 p50 p75
Deals involving change in contro l
bv_prem 22 191.0 45.8 97.6 153.0
Deals without change in control
bv_prem 27 191.5 31.7 98.3 169.2
COMPARISON STAGGERED DEALS - CONTROL DEFINED AS 20% OR MORE
N mean p25 p50 p75
Deals involving change in control
bv_prem 23 247.8 56.6 152.8 344.7
Deals without change in control
bv_prem 29 196.2 46.2 91.9 169.2
COMPARISON STAGGERED DEALS - CONTROL DEFINED AS 30% OR MORE
N mean p25 p50 p75
Deals involving change in control
bv_prem 24 254.1 66.4 146.1 278.0
Deals without change in control
bv_prem 30 185.3 46.2 92.6 169.2
Table 5. Premiums paid  (bv_prem) by percentage of ownership in 
staggered deals
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Mean Median N. obs.
Domestic 145.4 105.3 165
Cross border 165.2 100.2 74
Difference -19.8 5.1
No 148.8 122.0 93
Yes 153.2 97.1 146
Difference -4.5 24.9 *
Below median 165.5 106.7 164
Above median 120.9 85.1 75
Difference 44.6 * 21.7
0 or 1 150.8 118.0 182
2 153.8 76.2 57
Difference -2.9 41.7 *
Below median 180.5 129.0 139
Above median 111.2 76.7 100
Difference 69.2 ** 52.4 ***
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Shareholder 
protection
Table 6. Premiums (bv_prem) paid by deal characteristics: Other 
characteristics
Geographical 
scope
Listed
Regulatory 
strength
Deposit 
insurance
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Variable Full sample Listed 
CONTROL 24.138 30.065
CROSSB -38.982* -5.065
HHI 0.026 0.028
LISTED -27.143 --
ROE 1.972*** 7.286***  
RISK -1.884*** -1.748***  
LEV -3.931*** -4.708***
COVROE 0.789** 1.500**   
ASSETDIV -4.836 80.036
RELSIZE 7.601 20.172
TAGRWTH 3.050* -3.163
TAGRWTHSQ -0.043 0.032
INTERCEPT 141.312*** 43.76
N 178 106
r2_a 0.079 0.206
rmse 139.37 131.207
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7. Determinants of the premiums paid:  
Financial variables
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is the premium of the purchase price over the book value in percentages.  The full sample column contains 
all observations in the sample; the listed column contains those where the target is listed on a stock exchange.  The independent 
variables are:  CONTROL = binary variable equal to 1 if the deal involves a change in shareholder control of the target bank, 
CROSSB = binary variable equal to 1 if the bidder and target are chartered in different countries, HHI = Hirschman-Herfindahl index 
where the market is defined as the country in which the bank is headquartered, LISTED = binary variable equal to 1 if the target is 
listed on a stock exchange, ROE = return on equity, RISK = standard deviation of return on equity, LEV = equity divided by total 
assets, COVROE = covariance of ROE for bidder and target banks in the pre-merger years, ASSETDIV = absolute value of (1-|(net 
loans-other earning assets)/total earning assets) (from Laeven and Levine (2007)), RELSIZE = sum of bidder and target assets divided 
by bidder total assets, TAGRWTH = growth rate in target assets measure over the prior three years, TAGRWTHSQ = TAGRWTH 
squared. 
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Variable Full sample Listed
CONTROL 30.525 54.587*    
CROSSB -30.914 31.984
HHI 0.030 0.051*
LISTED -21.716 --
ROE 1.885** 8.661***  
RISK -1.700*** -1.773**   
LEV -4.809*** -6.769***
COVROE 0.883** 1.802**   
ASSETDIV 20.134 92.031
RELSIZE 11.197 12.071
TAGRWTH 3.918** -2.931
TAGRWTHSQ -0.077** -0.02
SHPROTECT -1.123 -1.646
DEP_INS -41.182 -45.250*    
REG_STRENGTH -12.041 -26.946*    
INTERCEPT 261.163*** 257.824***  
N 171 99
r2_a 0.108 0.313
rmse 135.077 119.11
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8. Determinants of the premiums paid:  
Financial and regulatory variables
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is the premium of the purchase price over the book value in percentages.  The full sample column contains 
all observations in the sample; the listed column contains those where the target is listed on a stock exchange.  The independent 
variables are:  CONTROL = binary variable equal to 1 if the deal involves a change in shareholder control of the target bank, 
CROSSB = binary variable equal to 1 if the bidder and target are chartered in different countries, HHI = Hirschman-Herfindahl index 
where the market is defined as the country in which the bank is headquartered, LISTED = binary variable equal to 1 if the target is 
listed on a stock exchange, ROE = return on equity, RISK = standard deviation of return on equity, LEV = equity divided by total 
assets, COVROE = covariance of ROE for bidder and target banks in the pre-merger years, ASSETDIV = absolute value of (1-|(net 
loans-other earning assets)/total earning assets) (from Laeven and Levine (2007)), RELSIZE = sum of bidder and target assets divided 
by bidder total assets, TAGRWTH = growth rate in target assets measure over the prior three years, TAGRWTHSQ = TAGRWTH 
squared. 
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Variable Full sample Listed
CONTROL 31.075 53.337*    
CROSSB -257.193 -232.934
HHI 0.030 0.055*
LISTED -21.943 --
ROE 1.738** 8.209***  
RISK -1.778*** -2.003***  
LEV -4.937*** -7.180***
COVROE 0.746* 1.757**   
ASSETDIV 11.575 80.597
RELSIZE 11.623 13.925
TAGRWTH 3.078* -3.678
TAGRWTHSQ -0.055* 0.004
SHPROTECT 0.876 0.848
SHPROTECT*CROSSB -2.776 -4.195
DEP_INS -77.669* -89.033**   
DEP_INS*CROSSB 64.429 92.356**   
REG_STRENGTH -34.159* -52.430**   
REG_STRENGTH*CROSSB 34.982* 39.921*    
INTERCEPT 396.177*** 414.201***  
N 171 99
r2_a 0.111 0.318
rmse 134.854 118.7
p-values (Reg.var+interaction)
t_sharehol~v 0.18 0.07
t_di 0.64 0.92
t_regul_st~h 0.93 0.34
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 9. Determinants of the premiums paid:  
Financial and regulatory variables - Interactions
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is the premium of the purchase price over the book value in percentages.  The full sample column contains 
all observations in the sample; the listed column contains those where the target is listed on a stock exchange.  The independent 
variables are:  CONTROL = binary variable equal to 1 if the deal involves a change in shareholder control of the target bank, 
CROSSB = binary variable equal to 1 if the bidder and target are chartered in different countries, HHI = Hirschman-Herfindahl index 
where the market is defined as the country in which the bank is headquartered, LISTED = binary variable equal to 1 if the target is 
listed on a stock exchange, ROE = return on equity, RISK = standard deviation of return on equity, LEV = equity divided by total 
assets, COVROE = covariance of ROE for bidder and target banks in the pre-merger years, ASSETDIV = absolute value of (1-|(net 
loans-other earning assets)/total earning assets) (from Laeven and Levine (2007)), RELSIZE = sum of bidder and target assets divided 
by bidder total assets, TAGRWTH = growth rate in target assets measure over the prior three years, TAGRWTHSQ = TAGRWTH 
squared. 
 
